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A. Demurrer-Declaratory Judgment Action
Generally, if a plaintiff's pleading in a declaratory judgment action al-
leges an actual or justiciable controversy it states a cause of action, and a
demurrer will not be sustained.' Where, however, it is plain there is no
basis for declaratory relief, as in First Nat'l Trust & Say. Bank v. Raphael,2
the demurrer is properly sustained and the action dismissed. In this case
plaintiff sought a cancellation of an easement for light and air, and the lower
court, deciding the easement was still in existence, sustained defendant's de-
murrer. Properly speaking, the real issue was the existence or nonexistence
of the easement, and the Court's declaration to this effect was appropriate.
Although the decision did not require such a declaration and permitted a
demurrer, it is clear that the disposition in the lower court on the demurrer
was treated as a decision on the merits.3 Any necessary later additional relief
to defendant would therefore be proper under section 8-581 of the Code
which provides a method to enforce a "declaratory judgment, order or de-
cree." In the present case it is altogether likely that other relief will be re-
quired, and an application of the general rule requiring a declaration gives a
better basis for future relief than a dismissal on demurrer.
B. Mandamus
1. Compelling High-way Commissioner To Condemn
Mandamus was brought to compel the State Highway Commissioner to
acquire by purchase or condemnation land being used for a highway. On
appeal, in May v. Whitlow, 4 the Court stated that while mandamus was not
technically a proper remedy to try the issue of ownership of the land, it held
that the objection to mandamus should not be sustained since the real issue,
that is, the right of appellees to compel the State Highway Commissioner to
institute condemnation proceedings against them, was fully developed and
decided.
It would have helped to prevent unnecessary procedural quibbles, such as
* Professor of Law, College of William and Mary. Member, Virginia Bar. A.B.,
1931, Washington and Lee University; M.A., 1932, Ohio State University; LL.B., 1935,
University of Cincinnati; LL.M, 1940, Columbia University.
1. See Yukon Pocahontas Coal Co. v. Ratliff, 175 Va. 366, 6 S.E.2d.303 (1940).
2. 201 Va. 718, 113 S.E.2d 683 (1960).
3. See id. at 722, S.E.2d at 687.
4. 201 Va. 533, 111 S.E2d 804 (1960).
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whether injunction and declaratory judgments are adequate remedies5 here,
if the Court had held mandamus to be an alternative procedure. The case
would not then strain the earlier decisions cited by the Court permitting
mandamus under special facts to compel the Highway Commissioner to in-
stitute condemnation proceedings. The practical approach of the lower
court, allowing mandamus procedure, is to be preferred, and it is clear the
Supreme Court of Appeals will be required in subsequent cases to extricate
itself from the dilemma it has created by stating that mandamus is improper.
2. Enforcing Ministerial Duties of Municipal Council
In an action of mandamus6 to compel the mayor and city council to
establish another voting district under section 24-45, which provides, "there
shall not be less than one election district for every one thousand voters or
fractional part thereof above five hundred," the statute was held mandatory
and the mayor and city council could be required by mandamus to estab-
lish another district or districts within a reasonable time if the evidence justi-
fied it. However, the Court could not direct the manner and details of
establishing such voting districts, that being within the sound discretion of
the city council.
While mandamus is most frequently directed to individuals, this case shows
that there is nothing to prevent its use in a proper case against governmental
units failing to perform their ministerial duties.
C. Deed of Trust
1. Trustees' Commissions and Counsel Fees
In Bradley v. Canter trustees under a deed of trust were allowed the
trustee's commission of five per cent of the sale price of the foreclosed prop-
erty as provided by section 55-59(13), counsel fees for defending suits in
which a federal court enjoined foreclosure of the deed of trust and appoint-
ed a receiver for the property, and counsel fees for defending proceedings
to determine rights to proceeds from a foreclosure of the deed of trust. How-
ever the trustees were denied one-half commissions on each of the tvo fore-
closure sales enjoined by the federal court. Although the deed of trust pro-
vided for one-half commissions if the property was advertised for sale and
not sold, as here occurred, the Court interpreted this provision as applying
to cases where there is a redemption of the land and one-half the amount of
the debt would be a fair basis upon which to compute the commission.
5. See PHELPs, IAN-DBOOK OF THE VIRGINIA RULE-s OF PROCEDURE IN AcToNs AT LAw 58
(1959), citing Rinehart & Dennis Co. v. McArthur, 123 Va. 556, 96 SE. 829 (1918).
6. Andrews v. Shepherd, 201 Va. 412, 111 S:E.2d 279 (1959).
7. 201 Va. 747,113 S.E.2d 878 (1960).
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It is to be regretted that the Supreme Court of Appeals did not take this
occasion to comment upon the position of counsel as a trustee on a deed of
trust. By passing over the question the Court seems to give tacit approval to
the widespread custom in the state to render various legal services in con-
nection with deeds of trust for which a professional fee is charged and at
the same time to act as trustee receiving the commission for this service.
The question of whether counsel should act in both capacities seems to be an
appropriate one for discussion and clear delineation.
2. Federal Receivers' Fees as Expense of Sale
In Bradley v. Canters a federal receiver represented to a federal court
that he could negotiate a sale of property subject to deeds of trust for a price
sufficient to discharge the outstanding trusts and liens. The federal court
enjoined the trustees from conducting the advertised foreclosure sale. Later
it developed the receiver could not negotiate such a sale, and the injunction
was dissolved. The Virginia lower court's decree recognized orders of the
federal court directing payment of the receiver's fees and expenses from
funds realized on foreclosure. This was reversed on appeal. It was held
that a federal receiver's fee could not be made an expense of sale on fore-
closure where the receiver's services were wholly unrelated to the trust and
the sale. Moreover the federal order was subject to collateral attack, since
the Court found that the federal court had no jurisdiction to enter an order
impairing the existing liens of the deeds of trust.
This is a well-reasoned decision. The security of deeds of trust, the en-
forcement of which is basically local, should not be permitted to be impaired
because of separate litigation affecting the debtor. It is difficult to see how a
different result could have been reached without seriously affecting the con-
tract and lien principles traditionally and properly applied to such cases.
D. Venue
1. Proceeding To Determiine Rights to Proceeds From Foreclosure of
Deed of Trust
Bradley v. Canter also involved proceedings to determine the respective
rights of litigants' to proceeds paid into court from the sale of land, which
required the determination by the trial court of the amount of liens against
the land. The Court held that venue was properly laid in the county where
the real estate was located because the proceeding was quasi in rem. It dealt
with trust funds and the account was required to be filed in the county where
8. Ibid.
9. Trustees under a second deed of trust who bought the property at the foreclosure
sale against trustees under the first deed of trust.
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the real estate is located. In such a case personal service on the nonresident
defendants was not required.
The basis of the decision is not clear. The Court does not refer to any
specific venue statute and cites only authorities concerning equity juris-
diction. If the Court is saying that there are types of equity cases where
the venue statutes are inadequate and venue is derived from traditional
equity jurisdiction, it is very important for this to be set out without
equivocation. The Court, very probably, did not intend to base venue
upon the injunction since it was not the main relief sought, and this would
seem to be a sensible view.10 On the other hand, one is inclined to ask why,
since section 55-59(13) provides "no purchaser [is] required to see to the
application of. the proceeds," the purchaser has standing in court to establish
his claim in the form of a proceeding to determine the rights to proceeds
from the foreclosure? Under this approach the injunction would seem
the essence of the case. The Court will sooner or later have to answer the
question of how much a case must be involved with an injunction for it to
be determinative of venue.
2. Action Against Committee of General Assembly
The NAACP brought an action against an investigating committee of
the General Assembly seeking a discovery of certain records in possession
of the committee and an injunction against the committee proceeding
further. On motion by the committee the cause was removed from the Law
and Equity Court to the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond. On
appeal'- sections 8-38(9) and 8-40 were construed to limit any action
against the Commonwealth to the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond.
12
The Court in this case indulges in a little judicial legislation. There is
no effort to "enjoin or otherwise suspend or affect any judgment or decree
10. However an excellent opportunity was afforded the Court to decide whether
the provisions of § 8-611 or those of the general venue statutes of §§ 8-38, -39 apply. This
question was left open in County School Bd. v. Snead, 198 Va. 100, 92 S.E.2d 497
(1956). Lile suggests the general venue provision only would apply, but a broader
base for the many variations of the injunction problem would seem to be afforded by
§ 8-611 providing generally for jurisdiction in the county, etc., "in which the act or
proceeding is to be done, or is doing, or apprehended." Lima's EQurrY PLEADING .A-D
PrAcT-E § 340 (3d ed. 1952).
11. NAACP v. Committee, 201 Va. 890, 114 S.E.2d 721 (1960).
12. According to the Court, if a suit or action
provided in § 8-38(9) is brought in any court, other than the Circuit Court of
the City of Richmond, and proceeded to a final decision in such court, the
"judgment or decree, so far as it may be against any of the public officers or
public corporations mentioned in Paragraph (9), or against the Commonwealth,
shall be void:'
Id. at 900, 114 SE.2d at 729.
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on behalf of the Commonwealth," '3 and nothing in section 8-40 gives
section 8-38(9) a more extensive operation than it has on its face. If the
legislature had intended to provide that any action or suit against the
Commonwealth had to be brought in the Circuit Court of the City of
Richmond, it could have said so.
E. Service of Process
Three cases in the federal courts involved the recurring problem of the
meaning of "doing business" within the state for the purpose of service
of process on a corporation. The first,14 an action for damages under
the Jones Act' 5 for injuries sustained by a seaman while in the employ of
defendant corporation, arose while the statute on service of process still
contained the phrase "in any action or proceeding against it growing out
of such business." 16 The business done in Virginia consisted of three
visits by the single ship owned by the corporation, one visit shortly after
process in the present case had been served. Plaintiff's contract of employ-
ment was made outside the state and he vWas injured outside the state. Al-
though the court said that the defendant was "doing business" in Virginia
as of the date of service of process, it held that this action itself did not
"grow out of such business" done in Virginia, and substituted service of
process on the Secretary of the State was improper as to defendant.
In World Carriers, Inc. v. Bright17 an action was brought against the
employer by a seaman who had entered into a contract of employment
within the state. The lower court held this to be sufficient "doing business"
irrespective of whether there were other contacts within the state. On
appeal the question of "doing business" was not reached by the court
because the substituted process was had on an improper official of the
state under the new statute.'8
In the third case, Sikes v. Rexall Drug Co.,19 defendant corporation had
solicited orders throughout Virginia and shared advertising costs and cer-
tain sales arrangements. The only activity of the soliciting agents other
than soliciting orders was assisting defendant corporation in the use of
13. See VA. CODE ANN. 5 8-38(9) (Repl. Vol. 1957).
14. Silas v. Paroh S.S. Co, 175 F. Supp. 35 (E.D. Va. 1958), rev'd on other grounds
sub norn. World Carriers, Inc. v. Bright, 276 F.2d 857 (4th Cir. 1960).
15. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1958).
16. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.217 (1950), as amended, VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-111 (Repl.
Vol. 1956).
17. 276 F.2d 857 (4th Cir. 1960).
18. Service was on the Secretary of the Commonwealth instead of the clerk of the
State Corporation Commission, as required by VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-113 (Repl. Vol.
1956).
19. 176 F. Supp. 33 (MW.D. Va. 1959).
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advertising media, the display of products, and the payment of "push
money." The court held under the revised Virginia statute2" that such
activities were hardly enough to meet the "solicitation plus" test in
International Harvester Co. v. Commonwealth2l and quashed the service
of process which had been made on the clerk of the State Corporation
Commission.
The following points should be observed about service of process: (1)
The test now in Virginia is merely whether the corporation was "doing
business" within the state, except where a single activity may be involved
in which case the cause of action must then arise out of the act done in
the state to satisfy due process. (2) The Rexall case is an open invitation
to the Virginia Court to continue the interpretation of Carnegie v. Art
Metal Constr. Co. 2 2 under the amended Virginia statute. This should not
be done. (3) The Rexall case not only fails to observe the statutory change
in Virginia, it also applies the wrong test under the present Supreme Court
cases which have required only "minimal contacts." 23 It is to be hoped
that when the question of the amended statute comes before the Supreme
Court of Appeals of Virginia a more careful analysis of the problem will
result in a decision which clearly equates the problem to federal due process.
F. Equity Pleading
Phipps v. Sutherland"4 reiterates the rule stated in Lile's Equity Pleading
and Practice2 5 to the effect that where the plaintiff's case depends in whole
or in part on documents, they should be described according to their legal
effect in the stating part of the plaintiff's bill. Further, they should be in-
corporated by reference into the bill and a copy, or the original, filed with
the bill as an exhibit. Since the executions and returns were not exhibited
with the bill as required, the Court construed the allegations that there
were other executions, and returns thereon, as legal conclusions only, and
affirmed the sustaining of the demurrer to plaintiff's bill.
Here, opportunity was given in the lower court for the amendment of
20. VA. COD, A-,N. § 13.1-111 (Repl. Vol. 1956).
21. 234 U.S. 579 (1914). In International Harvester the Court said at 587: "[Tlhere
was something more than mere solicitation .... [Tihere was a continuous course of
shipment of machines into Kentucky. There was authority to receive payment in
money, check or draft, and to take notes payable at banks in Kentucky." The "solicita-
tion plus" doctrine of International Harvester has been clearly repudiated. Caplin,
Doing Business, 5 Pa.c. LAW 72 (Oct. 1959).
22. 191 Va. 136, 60 S.E.2d 17 (1950).
23. See, e.g., Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958); McGee v. International
Life Ins. Co, 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
24. 201 Va. 448, 456, 111 S.E.2d 422, 428 (1959).
25. Section 106, at 65 (3d ed. 1952).
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the bill after the demurrer was sustained on the ground that the allega-
tions were merely conclusions. This normally should afford counsel ample
opportunity for meeting the requirements of the rule.
G. Grounds of Defense and Answer Filed Late
In Turner v. Byr ford Buick Corp. 2 plaintiff objected to defendant's late
filing of his answer on the ground that it was not filed within twenty-one
days after service of the motion as required by Rule 3:5, but the trial
court allowed it for "good cause shown." Since the record showed no
abuse of the discretion permitted by Rule 3:13 for the extension of the
time, the order of the lower court was upheld.
In American Liberty Ins. Co. v. Breslerman,27 consolidated cases by in-
surance companies for declaratory judgments, the amended answer of the
policy-holder defendant in one case, and his answer and amended answer
in the other ca-se, were by leave of court filed on the day of trial because
the defendant was a nonresident and because both insurance companies had
been enjoined by a New York court fronT proceeding with the declaratory
judgments until one week before the day of the trial. On appeal it was
held that the chancellor did not abuse his discretion under Rules 2:23 and
2:12. Further, since it was agreed by all the parties that the two cases would,
be consolidated and that the original answer filed in one of the cases would
be treated as an answer in both cases, the insurance companies had waived
any objection to the late filing of the answer.
H. Burden of Proof
1. Vacancy of Premises insured Against Fire
Breslerman also held where an action is brought by an insurance company
seeking a declaration of nonliability under a fire insurance policy because
the premises were vacant at the time of the fire, the burden of proof was
on the policyholder not only to show that the agent knew the property
was vacant, but also to show the agent had this fact in mind at the time
the policies were issued. -s One might well question whether the burden
of adducing further evidence placed on the policyholder here is not too
great.
2. Agency
In Turner v. Burford Buick Corp.29 the general sales manager of de-
26. 201 Va. 693, 112 S.E.2d 911 (1960).
27. 201 Va. 822, 113 S.E.2d 862 (1960).
28. ibMd.
-29. 201 Va. 693, 112 S.E.2d 911 (1960).
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fendant admitted that the defendant driver was an employee and was
driving a company car. It was held that this made a prima facie case of
agency and the burden was then on the master to prove that the agent was
not acting within the scope of his employment when he committed the
tort.30 The approach of this case leads to less difficulty than one placing
a greater burden on the plaintiff in such cases.
I. Directed Verdict
The trial court in Turner had instructed the jury that it must render a
verdict for plaintiff against the defendant driver of the automobile upon
the ground that the driver was guilty of negligence as a matter of law. No
motion to strike the evidence was made. On appeal the Court held that
even though the driver was guilty of negligence as a matter of law, the
court could not direct a verdict for the plaintiff without a prior striking of
defendant's evidence because of the requirements of section 8-218 of the
Code which provides:
In no action tried before a jury shall the trial judge give to the jury
a peremptory instruction directing what verdict the jury shall render
unless the trial judge shall have granted a motion to strike the evidence
of the plaintiff or defendant, in which case the judge may direct a
verdict in conformity with his ruling on the motion to strike.3 1
No fair appraisal of the rulings in the state with respect to the motion
to strike the evidence shows any real difference between it and the motion
for a directed verdict. The reasonable minds test used in Virginia for the
motion to strike the evidence 2 is the one used by the great majority of
courts in this country in directing verdicts3 3 Why, then, should the Court,
which has been properly ignoring section 8-218 on the basis of the inherent
power of the Court to assure rational fact determination, suddenly give the
statute vitality when the recent amendment was simply intended to put
into the legislation the fact that it had no vitality? The General Assembly
should have repealed the statute, but its failure to do so does not change
the fact that the purpose was to bring the statute into accord with the
fact that courts in Virginia were directing verdicts.
Whether the defendant's negligence as a matter of law appeared as a
result of a motion to strike, or as a result of the Court's observation, should
30. The Court held further that when such prima fade case is made out the declara-
tions and admissions of the agent become admissible.
31. VA. CODE ANN. S 8-218 (Supp. 1960).
32. See, e.g., Richardson v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 163 Va. 394, 175 S.E. 727
(1934).
33. See 9 WIGMORF, EVIDENCE § 2495 (3d ed. 1940).
[Vol. 46
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make no difference. This matter is outside of section 8-218 because it poses
a question for the court,34 having a similar relationship to the proof that a
demurrer has to the pleading.3 5 If a question of law in a very traditional
sense is not involved, how are we to explain the many cases where the
decision is postponed until a motion to set aside the verdict is sustained or
where the Supreme Court of Appeals itself acts on such questions of law
and gives final judgment? 36 From what source comes this power, if not
because a question of law is involved?
There may well be cases where the Court as a procedural matter will
refuse to entertain the question in the absence of a motion to strike. It
should not do so, however, where it has decided under the facts the de-
fendant is guilty of negligence as a matter of law.
J. Summary Judgment Improper Where Bill of Particulars Insufficient
In Marshall v. Dean3" plaintiff sought to eject defendants from land con-
veyed by him to a church because of a violation of restrictive covenants
in the deed. The trial court sustained defendants' motion for summary
judgment because the facts stated in plaintiff's bill of particulars were not
sufficient to constitute a violation of the restrictive covenants or to support
the violation as stated in plaintiff's motion for judgment. On appeal the
Court held that even assuming the bill of particulars to be insufficient, the
motion for summary judgment alleged a violation of the covenants. It is
not necessarily the function of the bill of particulars, the Court said, to
state a cause of action.38
In stating the relationship of the summary judgment to bills of particulars
the Court very properly refused to permit the drastic summary judgment
procedure as a means of enforcing an adequate bill of particulars. 30
34. "[Wl7here fair minded persons can draw but one inference from the facts, the
question of contributory negligence is a question of law." Brown v. Damron, 197 Va.
309, 313, 89 S.E.2d 54, 56 (1955). "[XV]here reasonable men can draw but one inference
from the facts, negligence becomes a question of law." Nehi Bottling Co. v. Lambert,
196 Va. 949, 955, 86 S.E.2d 156, 159 (1955).
35. Often the ruling on demurrer is now postponed until proof because of the
completeness of background with which the court can review the question on the
proved facts as well as the pleaded facts. This shows a modem blend of the concepts
involved.
36. See City of Virginia Beach v. Roman, 201 Va. 879, 114 S.E.2d 749 (1960); Gottlieb
v. Andrus, 200 Va. 114, 104 S.E.2d 743 (1958).
37. 201 Va. 699, 112 SE.2d 895 (1960).
38. If the defendants desired amplification or explanation of this specific allegation,
they should have proceeded under Rule 3:18(d) which provides, after opportunity for
an amended bill of particulars, for striking the pleading not properly amplified if the
party is not informed fairly of the true nature of the claim or defense.
39. However, what would be the view of the Court if Rule 3:18(d) (see note 38
1960] 1653
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The application made by the Court of the rule in Carwile v. Richmond
Newspapers, InC. 40 seems appropriate. The Court in that case said that
the sumfnary judgment does not substitute a new method of trial where
an issue of fact still exists, that it is "not intended as a substitute for a de-
murrer,, a dem'urrer to the evidence or a motion to strike".41 It is-seen that
the purposes bf the summary judgment (absent a striking of the motion for
judgment) are clearly unrelated to implementing a bill of particulars. How-
ever, in repeating the rule that summary judgment is not intended as a sub-
stitute for a demurrer, a demurrer to the evidence or a motion to strike, the
Court in Marshall goes beyond the requirements of the case and states dicta
which it is hojed will be more thoroughly considered in later cases where
the point is directly in issue. With the motion to strike explicitly a part
of"Rule 3:20, there is no question now that the Carwile rule no longer
applies to it.
Ostensibly to give teeth to the summary judgment rule, since it does not
provide for testing the genuineness of the issue by affidavits, as is done in
the federal courts, a new provision, Virginia Code section 8-111.1. was
recently enacted. It provides for a procedure by which a party can obtain
the admission of facts or the admission of the genuineness of documents after
the commencement of an action. Under this statute the defendant in
Marshall 'might have secured sufficient admissions of fact to have secured a
summary judgment.
K. Discovery-Reco.'ds of Commnittee of General Assembly
In a bill for discovery and for an injunction against a legislative com-
mittee seciring information to assist in enacting laws,42 the Court held that
such committees acting wi thin the bounds of their authority act as the
legislature itself, and that the trial court correctly found it was without
authority to compel the disclosure of the records under the circumstances.
The opinion held merely that "on the record presented" the lower court
supra) had been followed and the motion for judgment had been stricken? Coitl the
Court then grant a motion for summary judgment? Under the words of the first
sentence of the Rule it would seem since the parties never were at issue, no motion
for summary judgment could properly be made.
If final judgment is desirable in such- cases, instead of the less drastic procedure
of §8-111 of the Code, under which the Court can exclude evidence of any matter not
described so plaily in the bill of pariiculars as to give notice, the simple' thing to do
would be to mend Rule 3:18(d) to provide a discretionary rule to this effect, rather
than to bring. it within the summary judgment rule. The matter is clearly related,
however, to the summary judgment rule, for the plaintiff has demonstrated there is
no genuine issue of fact.
40. 196 Va. 1, 82 S.E.2d 588 (1954).
41.'Id. at 5, 82 S.E.2d at 591.
42. NAACP v. Committee, 201 Va. 890, 114 S.E.2d 721 (1960).
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was without authority to compel a disclosure, and it is unfortunate that the
syllabus went further and declared the records to be "privileged", giving
the case a more extensive operation than was probably intended in this
difficult and growing field of law.
L. Objections
Goocb v. City of Lynchburg43 makes an interesting application of Rule
1:8 which provides that all objections shall state with reasonable certainty the
ground of objection. The city ordinance under which the accused was con-
victed of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicants
was not introduced into evidence by the prosecution, but the accused did
not object or take an exception in the trial court. It was contended the
motion to set aside the verdict as contrary to the law and the evidence was
an adequate and timely objection, although no reference was made to the
fact that the ordinance had not been formally introduced into evidence
when this motion was made.
The Court held the matter could not *be argued on appeal since the
failure to prove the ordinance had not been brought to the attention of the
trial court.
Since process was not issued at all in Goocb because the offense was com-
mitted in the presence of the arresting officer, the right to have the city
ordinance introduced into evidence would appear, if anything, more basic
than in Sisk v. Town of Shenandoah,4 where the accused was arrested on
a warrant and the failure of the city to introduce the ordinance into evidence
was fatal to her conviction, and this failure could not be rectified by
taking judicial notice of the ordinance on appeal.
It is not imperative today that municipal ordinances be proved;"ia they
should be judicially noticed in both lower and appellate courts. The Court
used Rule 1:8 to soften the application of its harsh rule of judicial notice
of ordinances. What it should have done was to provide a modern rule on
judicial notice of such law. Section 8-27041 wlich provides for copies of
43. 201 Va. 172, 110 S.E.2d 236 (1959).
44. 200 Va. 277, 105 S.E.2d 169 (1958). This was also a case of operating a motor
vehicle under the influence of alcohol. Relying on Collins v. City of Radford, 134
Va. 518, 113 S.E. 735 (1922), the lower court, although refusing to permit the town
to introduce a copy of the ordinance at that time, denied the defendant's motion to
strike the town's evidence. The Supreme Court of Appeals held the circuit court was
not authorized to take judicial notice of the town ordinance and the motion to strike
should have been sustained and the warrant dismissed. The Court specifically re-
pudiated the doctrine of the Collins case. The theory of this case was followed in a
civil case in Bell v. Hagmann, 200 Va. 626, 107 S.E.2d 426 (1959).
45. McCowiuCE, SELECTED "VRITINGS O-; EVIDENCE AND TRIAL 1068, at 1075 (1957),
reprinted from 5 VANx. L. REv. 296 (1952).
46. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-270 (Supp. 1960).
19601 1655
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city ordinances to be admitted in evidence, does not place an insuperable
obstacle in the way. Its purpose was not to spell out what laws could be
judicially noticed, but to provide a single method for the proof of all types
of law.
M. Judgments
1. How Life Extended
Two points are made clear by Phipps v. Sutherand.47 First, a judgment
may be kept alive perpetually if its life is extended by scire facias or an
action is brought within each twenty-year period under section 8-396.48
Second, to keep judgments rendered prior to the 1948 amendment 9 of
section 8-396 alive it is necessary to bring scire facias or an action within
the twenty-year period, and it is no longer possible to extend their life
merely by issuance of execution as was the practice prior to the amendment.
The Court is to be commended for taking a forthright position in in-
terpreting this statute and in insisting that the policy of the statute reach
every case affected. It is highly undesirable in interpreting this type of
legislation to read in special cases or to attempt the application of any
"justice" principle. The Court noted the statute was retroactive on its face,
and since it dealt with procedure only, did not affect any vested right.
2. Final Judgment
In line with earlier Virginia cases 0 the Court held in Turner v. Burford
Buick Corp.51 that a trial court's order setting aside the verdict and awarding
a new trial was not appealable as a final order.
In a recent case 52 brought to determine the ownership of sewer lines
constructed by the defendants, the trial court adjudicated ownership in the
plaintiff and directed defendants to execute a deed of conveyance, in default
of which the court would appoint a special comissioner to execute the deed.
It was held that the petition for appeal was timely although it was not pre-
sented within four months of the decree as required by Rule 5:4 and
section 8-489 of the Code, because these provisions apply only to final
judgments and decrees. This decree was not final, but interlocutory, 53
47. 201 Va. 448, 111 S.E.2d 422 (1959).
48. VA. CODE ANN. S 8-396 (Supp. 1960).
49. Va. Acts 1948, ch. 136.
50. See, e.g., Hatke v. Globe Indem. Co., 167 Va. 184, 188 S.E. 164 (1936).
51. 201 Va. 693, 112 S.E.2d 911 (1960).
52. Brooks v. Sanitation Authority, 201 Va. 934, 114 S.E.2d 758 (1960).
53. Under S 8-462, which applies to interlocutory appeals, the lower court adjudicated
the principles of the cause and an appeal from its decision could be taken at any time
until a final decree was entered.
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since defendant could refuse to convey as directed, and further action of the
court, not simply of a ministerial nature, would then be necessary. It is
interesting to compare this case with Dove v. May54 where the adjudication
that the highway commissioner had a right to take a private cemetery was
held not a final order and not appealable. So far as defendant was concerned
that case adjudicated the principles of the cause, for the lower court had
ruled there was no judicial review of the determination of the highway
commissioner that it was necessary to take defendant's property.
N. Appeal
1. Supplying Defects in Narrative of Testimony and Designations for
Printing
In the lower court in Collins v. Pulaski County55 appellants used a "nar-
rative of proceedings" instead of having the testimony transcribed. Appellees
had filed written objections to the narrative, and additional testimony
tendered by them was certified by the trial judge. Appellees moved to
dismiss the appeal because appellants had -iled a narrative which was in-
complete, misleading and inaccurate, thus violating Rule 5:1, section 3 (e).
The Court, in overruling the motion to dismiss, held that the designations
made by appellees supplied any alleged defects in the narrative and thus
the printed record contained all that was germane to the question to be
decided.
This sensible decision prevents technical objections from impairing the
use of the provisions of the rules for a "narrative of proceedings" and
places emphasis on the facts from whatever source they may appear. Since
counsel would be foolish to take a chance by withholding further designa-
tions claimed necessary to complete the record in the hope that the Court
would find a narrative incomplete, the decision results in a good operative
rule.
2. Decree Presumed Correct
In an annexation caseG6 the Court repeated the rule that there is a pre-
sumption of the correctness of the decision of the trial court on all questions
of fact and that decision is binding on the Supreme Court of Appeals unless
the decision is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.
3. Notice of Certification of Transcript
In Taylor v. Wood57 the Court found that counsel for appellees (bene-
54. 201 Va. 761, 113 S.E.2d 840 (1960).
55. 201 Va. 164, 110 S.E.2d 184 (1959).
56. County of Fairfax v. Town of Fairfax, 201 Va. 362, 111 S.E.2d 428 (1959).
57. 201 Va. 615, 112 S.E.2d 907 (1960).
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ficiaries under a will) in response to a letter from appellants' counsel waived
reasonable written notice of the tendering of the transcript for certification
required by Rule 5:1, section 3(f). Counsel for the executor, however,
made no reply to the letter from appellants' counsel.5 s A motion to dismiss
the appeal on the ground that appellants' counsel failed to give "opposing
counsel" the required reasonable written notice was denied because counsel
for the beneficiaries waived the requirement.
The Court here appropriately makes the question of notice depend upon
the relationslip of the client to the case, the participation of his counsel
in the case, and whether his interests could reasonably be said to have been
protected by counsel for other parties. It is another encouraging example
of the lack of patience of the Supreme Court of Appeals with attempts to
create technical error because of some inconsequential failure to meet exactly
the requirements of one of its Rules.
4. Appeal From Corporation Commission
In approving rates to be charged for insurance the State Corporation
Commission used a formula including twenty per cent for agents' com-
missions instead of the customary twenty-five per cent. The Virginia As-
sociation of Insurance Agents appealed,59 contending the rates would regulate
compensation of agents. The Association was not a formal party to the
proceedings, but its counsel had participated. The appeal was dismissed on
the ground that the Association was not, under sections 38.1-279 and 12-63
of the Code, which provide for appeals from final orders or decisions of
the Corporation Commission, a party interested in or aggrieved by the
orders"0 because the Commission was not fixing commissions to be paid
by insurers to their agents, but rather using a figure for such commissions
in arriving at a fair and equitable rate.
In an appeal"' from the State Corporation Commission's allotment of ter-
ritory for gas utility service the Court declared that under the Constitution
58. The Court said at 619, 112 S.E.2d at 910:
As the transcript shows, counsel for the bank executor made no appearance
during the taking of the depositions or at the trial in the lower court. They had
no firsthand knowledge whether the transcript of the proceedings was correct
or not and left that entirely to counsel [for appellees], with whom they are col-
laborating in the motion to dismiss. Hence, the interests of the bank executor in
seeing to the accuracy of the transcript was fully protected by counsel for the
appellees ....
59. Virginia Ass'n of Ins. Agents v. Commonwealth, 201 Va. 249, 110 S.E.2d 223 (1959).
60. It was held further that the mere fact that the Commission permitted the ap-
pellants to intervene does not make them interested parties. The Commission often
hears parties who are not in a strict legal sense interested parties.
61. Virginia Gas Distribution Corp. v. Washington Gas Light Co, 201 Va. 370, 111
S.E.2d 439 (1959).
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of Virginia0 2 the order "cannot be upset in the absence of a showing of an
abuse of the discretion vested in it" and the action by the Commission
"shall be regarded as prima facie just, reasonable and correct ... "
While the Constitution of Virginia does not seem immediately to convey
the rule followed by the Court, judicial statesmanship of a high order caused
the Court to continue the earlier interpretations assuring the State Corpora-
tion Commission of rather complete control of its proper sphere of action.
5. No Transcript of Testimony on Counsel Fee
Where no transcript of oral testimony, taken at a hearing on a petition
for lawyers' fees, was provided as required by Rule 5:1, section 3(e), the
Court 3 nevertheless found that the fees had not been improperly allowed. 4
No evidence was offered of abuse of discretion in allowing the fee or the
amount thereof.
The clear implication seems to be that some questions relating to fees
could still be argued in the absence of a transcript of testimony concerning
them. However, the case should caution the bar to include this testimony.
6. Combining Mechanics Liens for Jurisdictional Amount
In Shelton v. Ogus6 5 the Court held that the $300 jurisdictional amount
required by section 8-464 for an appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeals
was not satisfied where a contractor sought to appeal an order declaring
invalid his six separate mechanics liens of $160 each. The Court found that
each building and lot represented a separate security and regarded the pro-
ceeding as in rem to enforce six separate mechanics liens against six separate
parcels of realty. 6
The substantial dealings by the contractor here were with the corporation,
and the question was the validity of this contract for $810.00 as it affected
the property of the several new owners. Here the statute on jurisdictional
amount could easily have been dealt with as an administrative device looking
62. VA. CoNsr. § 156(f), which provides that the Court has jurisdiction to determine
the reasonableness and-justness of the action as well as any other matter arising under
such appeal.
63. Buchanan Realty Corp. v. Looney, 201 Va. 432, 111 S.E.2d 410 (1959).
64. The lawyers were shown to have the necessary court authority; the services were
not antagonistic to defendants; and the decree recited that the fee was allowed because
they had "rendered substantial service to all of the owners" of the land.
65. 201 Va. 417, 111 S.E.2d 408 (1959).
66. The Court, however, did state:
Though establishment of the several liens and award of the several judgments
sought might be accomplished and made effectual in the same decree, yet each
judgment in rem would necessarily be against the specific parcel of land upon
which the lien existed ....
201 Va. at 420, 111 S.E.2d at 410.
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to the value of the real controversy. The case illustrates the need for drafting
a more realistic section dealing with the jurisdictional amount in the
Supreme Court of Appeals, or eliminating any such requirement. It would
seem that the economics of appeal will eliminate the "too small" cases in
most instances, and the $300 requirement stands simply, as here, as an im-
pediment to appropriate appeal.
0. Suit by Nonresident Guardian in Own Name
In Vroon v. Templin67Z the United States Court of Appeals held that
Code section 26-59, providing no person not a resident of Virginia shall be
appointed or allowed to qualify or act as personal representative unless
there also be appointed to serve with him a resident, does not require the
appointment of a resident in order for the nonresident guardian to maintain
a tort action in Virginia.68
The rule set forth by the United States Court of Appeals is certainly
desirable to reduce the possibility of procedural complications in cases of
this type. However, many lawyers will be surprised to learn that there is
any question with respect to the law of Virginia that a resident guardian
is required and the suit must be in the name of the ward. The need for a
rule to avoid procedural complications is also desirable in the case of wrong-
ful death actions, but the same court held earlier 69 that the 1950 amendment
to the statute70 makes it clear that a nonresident could not sue as personal
representative in Virginia in such cases.
LEGISLATION
A. Liens
Section 8-386 of the Code, providing that a judgment is a lien on real
estate "at or after the date of the judgment", was rewritten by an amendment
providing that every judgment of a state or federal court is a lien "from
the time such judgment is recorded on the judgment lien docket." 71 All
special provisions with respect to the confession of judgments have been
removed including those with respect to the priority of judgments confessed
in vacation.
Since the docketing required under section 8-390 is the same as that for
section 8-386, it is difficult to see why 8-390 was not eliminated. A proviso
67. 278 F.2d 345 (4th Cir. 1960).
68. The court also remanded the case for the district court to determine whether it
was still Virginia law that the guardian could not sue in his own name for the
injuries to his son.
69. Holt v. Middebrook, 214 F.2d 187 (4th Cir. 1954).
70. See VA. CODE ANN. § 26-59 (Supp. 1960).
71. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-386 (Supp. 1960).
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was added to section 8-390 providing that a revived judgment secured
pursuant to 8-396 shall not be a lien as to a purchaser for a valuable con-
sideration without notice unless the judgment is again docketed.72 This
too seems to be covered now by section 8-386.
As to suits to reach property conveyed by a judgment debtor, section
8-393 has been amended to provide for recording a notice of lis pendens
in the manner provided by section 8-142 before the expiration of the ten-
year statute of limitations.73
B. Procedure
Section 8-511 on pleading contracts has been rewritten.74 Also a new
section has been added to the Code by which a party can obtain the ad-
mission of facts or the admission of the genuineness of documents after the
commencement of an action. 5
C. Garnishment
Section 34-29 of the Code dealing with garnishment of wages or salary
has been rewritten to provide a table to make it easier to determine the
amounts intended by the statute to be exempt.73 The exemption to a laboring
man or woman who is a householder or head of a family is also extended
to "any person under an order of a court to support a parent, child, husband,
or wife," and may be claimed on his or her behalf by any agency of govern-
ment or person in interest. Section 8-441 on the institution of garnishment
proceedings has been amended to require certain information under oath
of a judgment creditor, his agent or attorney, before a summons shall issue
and has provided that any judgment creditor knowingly "giving false in-
formation shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.77
72. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-390 (Supp. 1960).
73. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-393 (Supp. 1960).
74. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-511 (Supp. 1960). The changes are: (1) The plaintiff is now
"entitled to a judgment on such affidavit and statement of account" and the language
"on motion made in open court" has been dropped. (2) The section is extended to
civil warrants. (3) Where the defendant appears and pleads under oath, the plaintiff,
on motion, shall have a continuance. (4) Counsel may not now be able to act for the
defendant in signing the affidavit. (5) Now the defendant must appear and plead
under oath that the plaintiff is entitled to recover from the defendant a certain sum
less than that stated in plaintiff's affidavit. Judgment may then be taken by the plaintiff
for the sum admitted, and the case tried as to the residue.
75. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-111.1 (Supp. 1960). This section is identical to Rule 36 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and would seem much more appropriately placed
along with the Virginia rules relating to discovery, rather than with the sections on
bills of particulars.
76. VA. CODE ANN. § 34-29 (Supp. 1960).
77. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-441 (Supp. 1960). Although the language is very awkward, it
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